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PROFESSIONAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS: A REPLY
In applying the term "association" as used in section 7701 (a) (3), Mr.
Thies argues that we can find guidance in a "largely overlooked" cranny of
the law: the "common law association." 1 Asser ~ing that this form of
organization was characterized by centralized management and continuity
of life, but not by limited liability or transferability of interests, Mr. 'l'hies
concludes that the first two characteristics alone are the o:tJly proper criteria
of association status. The test, in other words, is whether the organization
under examination resembles a "classic common law association," not
whether it resembles a corporation; and this in turn means that centralizccl
management and continuity of life are sufficient (and, evidently, necessary)
to confer association status under section 7701(a) (3). Mr. Thies then as-
serts that "virtually all" new-style professional association and corporation
statutes satisfy these criteria.
Although the final step in Mr. Thies' ingenious argument is independently
open to debate, I wish to examine here only his central thesis-that the term
"association" in section 7701 (a) (3) refers to what he calls "classic com-
mon law associations." If this theory is correct, Mr. Thies is right in assert-
ing that the courts, Treasury lawyers, private practitioners, and commenta-
tors have been repeatedly wrong in their understanding of this area. It
would also follow, although Mr. Thies does not explicitly press this corolllu'Y
to his theory, that the new-style professional association and corporation
statutes which evoked the entire debate were unnecessary: In his view, any
professional group that so desired-or even a solo practitioner 2-could hnve
organized a common law association as a means of qualifying for corporate
tax status. If Mr. Thies' novel argument is wrong, however, the claim of n
new-style professional association or corporation to association status must
continue to rest on the familiar arguments that have been offered by other
commentators on this subject.
The validity of the central point in Mr. Thies' argument can be con-
veniently tested by asking how a group of taxpayers who wanted to organize
a common law association could go about doing so. His answer, I take it,
1 Thies, Professiona~ Service Organisations: .A Oomment, 24 TAX L. REV. 291 (1969),
commenting on my article, Professiona~ Service Organiz/lt'ions: .A Oritiquo 01 tIla
titerature, 23 TAX L. REV. 429 (1968). See also an earlier statement of :Mr. Thies'
views, .An Open Letter to a Former Secretary of the Treasury, 46 T.\XES 529 (1968).
Though I am pleased to have :Mr. Thies' concurrence in my criticism of somo othor
comments on this subject, he overstates my view in characterizing theso arguments
as t t overly polemical in the worst sense of the term." I usell the term t t polemical' ,
as a synonym for disputatious or argumentative, and includod my own 1961 artiole
in the list of Hpolemical literature." See 23 TAX L. REV. at 429.
2 Although :Mr. Thies seems to be confident that a one man association would be
recognized as such by the courts, other commentators havo beon moro cautious. Tho
observation in Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation 01 Oorporations ana
Shareholders, concerning one man organizations quoted by Mr. Thies, is as persuasivo
to me today as it was when I wrote it in 1959 (1st edition, p. 34); but I learnod
long ago not to confuse my theories with judicial judgments.
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would be simple: let them copy the Kintner agreement. Whatever might
have been the effect of such an agreement under the "earlier, largely over-
looked jurisprudence" that Mr. Thies wishes to revive, however, its effect
for at least half a century would almost certainly be to create a partnership
under section 6(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act:
A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carryon as
co-owners a business for profit.
A major characteristic of classic common law associations was a lack of ca-
pacity to own property, with the result that the members of such an associa-
tion were co-owners of any property that was held in the group name.
Contrary to Mr. Thies' suggestion at page 298, it is not the intent of the
parties that determines whether an unincorporated association operated for
profit is a partnership or not; its status under section 6(1) is involuntary,
as businessmen seeking to avoid partnership status have often discovered
to their dismay. :J\.h-. Thies to the contrary notwithstanding, therefore, I
continue to think that eounsel for the taxpayer in the Kint11cr case was
correct in conceding that the group was a partnership under local law;
and that the same status would befall other groups using that agreement,
in most if not all states.s Once the agreement is brought within the aegis
of the UPA, any contractual provisions conflicting with the statute (e.o.,
attempts to create centralized management or continuity of life) must give
way.
In view of the intended breadth of section 6(1) of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, it should not be surprising that the only classic common law asso-
ciations that one now meets in real life-as distinguished from the pages of
old law dictionaries-are voluntary, nonprofit clubs and similar groups.
Indeed, the very legal encyclopedia on which l\fr. Thies relies in support
of his view that the Kintner group was a common law association rather
than a partnership states:
[A] ccording to the rule generally recognized at the present time, the
members of a voluntary association of individuals or of an unincorpo-
3 I might add that if a business group did sueceed in estnbllihing itself D!.! n non·
partnership co=on law association, it would confront a morass of legal nttributes
that are either poorly suited, or positively antngonistic, to tho conduet of busine:l3,
including a lack of capacity to contract or sue in tho group numl!. Although thes;)
and other disabilities are mitigated, to a degreo that varies from atate to abte,
by statutory provisions and judicial wlerancl!, they renudn suillciently troublesome
even for nonprofit groups as to enCOUl'3ge them to organizo under nonprofit ml!mbership
corporation statutes. As a result, the law relating to eo=on law nssociations liD!.!
atrophied for want of exercise, and fow businessmen or professional prnctitioners,
if well-advised, would want to be governed by its rarely litigated '\"ngaria As I hD.'\"O
argued in the text, however, they are protected ngainst these une1w.rted EC<'lS b,r seotion
6(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act, which imposes partnership sbtus "iUy·ni1l)·
on any such <<association of two or more persons to c:lrry on as co-owners n bU5inCS5
for profit."
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rated company organized for profit are to be considered as partners in
their relations to third persons.4
Another encyclopedia is even more explicit:
Where ... the association is organized for commercial purposes, and
operated for pecuniary profit, it is no more than a partnership, and the
rights and liabilities incident to that relation attach to its members, as
well as between the members themselves, as between a member and the
association, and as between members and third persons dealing with
them or the association.G
For at least 50 years, then, the classic common law association has been the
voluntary, nonprofit club or similar group; and one can harcUy assume that
its characteristics were the ones singled out by Congress as the only proper
test of corporate tax liability for" associations" as that term is used in sec-
tion 7701(a) (3).
It should not be an occasion for surprise, then, that the Supreme Court
in Hecht v. Malley (relied on by Mr. Thies), eschewed his sweeping conclu-
sion about the meaning of "association" in section 7701(a) (3), and instead
held very cautiously:
We think that the word" association" as used in the [Revenue Act of
1918] clearly includes "Massachusetts Trusts" such as those herein in-
volved, having quasi-corporate organizations under which they are en-
gaged in carrying on business enterprises. What other form of "associa-
tions", if any, it includes, we need not, and do not, determine.a
The most that Mr. Thies has established, it seems to me, is that an unin-
corporated nonprofit group maybe encompassed by the term "association"
in section 7701 (a) (3) if it possesses the characteristics of continuity of life
and centralized management. If the common law association in question is
operated for profit, however, it must first establish that it is not a partner-
ship within the meaning of the local version of section 6(1) of the Uniform
Partnership Act, since partnership status will render unenforceable any
claim in its articles of association to continuity of life and centralized
management. I see little or no possibility of surmounting this hurdle, even
if the group follows the Kintner model with complete fidelity. For this rea-
son, I cannot accept the central, and crucial, theorem of ~rr. Thies' argu-
ment.
BORIS I. BITTKER
Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School
46 AM. JUR. 2d Associations ana Clubs § 2 (1962) (footnote omitted).
117 C.J.S. Associations § 1(3) (1937) (footnotes omitted).
\I 265 U.S. at 157 (footnote omitted).
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